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Beales v. State: IMPEACHMENT 
BY PRIOR CONVICTION PER-
MISSIBLE ONLY WHERE THE 
TRIAL COURT DETERMINES 
THAT THE PROBATIVE VALUE 
OUTWEIGHS THE DANGER OF 
UNFAIR PREJUDICE. 
In Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 619 
A.2d 105 (1993), the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland ruled that under Mary-
land Rule 1-502, evidence of a prior 
conviction should be admitted for im-
peachment purposes only if the court 
finds that the probative value of the 
evidence outweighs the danger of unfair 
prejudice to the witness or objecting 
party. The court abandoned the prior 
rule which permitted convictions for 
crimes within the last fifteen years, 
which are relevant to the witness' cred-
ibility, to be per se admissible. The new 
rule requires the trial court to ascertain 
the nature of the prior conviction and to 
perform a preliminary balancing test 
before ruling on the admissibility of the 
evidence. 
William Lee Beales was charged 
with battery and carrying a deadly 
weapon with the intent to injure .. On 
January 9,1992, eight days after Mary-
land Rule 1-502 on impeaclmlent by 
prior conviction took effect, he was 
tried by a jury in Baltimore City. At 
trial, the defense called Joseph 
Lawrence, a friend of the defendant 
who had witnessed the incident at issue, 
to testify that the defendant was not 
involved. During cross-examination of 
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Lawrence, the prosecutor asked if he 
had ever been convicted of a crime of 
dishonesty. In fact, Lawrence had been 
convicted of theft fourteen years be-
fore. Defense counsel objected and 
argued that Maryland Rule 1-502 re-
quired the court to make a preliminary 
determination that the probative value 
of the evidence outweighed the unfair 
prejudice. The court overruled defense 
counsel's objection and without con-
ducting further inquiry, admitted the 
evidence. 
Beales was convicted of battery and 
sentenced to three years in prison. He 
appealed to the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland and, prior to any 
determination by that court, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted certio-
rari. The issue before the court was 
whether the trial judge erred in refusing 
to employ the balancing test under Rule 
1-502 before admitting Lawrence's 
prior conviction as impeachment evi-
dence. The court of appeals reversed 
the judgment and remanded the case to 
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for 
a new trial. 
In its analysis, the court of appeals 
recognized that under the prior statute, 
evidence of infamous crimes was per se 
admissible for impeaclmlent purposes. 
Previously, only lesser crimes, which 
affected" the credibility of the witness, 
were left to the trial court's discretion. 
Md. Cts. & J ud. Proc. Code Ann. § 10-
905 (a) (1989). The court emphasized 
that the adoption of Rule 1-502 did not 
change thedefmition of infamous crimes, 
which includes crimes offalsity such as 
theft, but rather eliminated the auto-
matic admissibility of such crimes for 
impeachment purposes. Beales, 329 
Md. at 269,619 A.2d at 108. 
Next, the court examined Rule 1-
502 to determine the circumstances 
under which the trial court would be 
required to employ the balancing test. 
The State relied on the principles of 
statutory construction in arguing that 
absent a comma in the statute, the re-
quirement of balancing applies only to 
the clause immediately preceding it in 
the rule. Thus, the State maintained 
that weighing a prior conviction's pro-
bative value against its prejudice would 
be necessary only when the crime is 
relevant to the witness's credibility. Id. 
at 270, 619 A.2d at 108. The court 
rejected this proposition as well as the 
State's contention that the interpreta-
tion of the new rule should be consistent 
with the prior statute, which provided 
for the automatic admission of infa-
mouscrimes. Instead, the court adopted 
the defendant's argument that Rule 1-
502 "requires a preliminary determina-
tion of probativeness and potentially 
unfair prejudice for all convictions used 
to impeach credibility." Id. at 270, 619 
A.2d at 109 (emphasis in original). 
In construing the language of the 
rule, the court applied two basic canons 
of statutory interpretation. First, it 
examined the plain language of the stat-
ute by assigning common meanings to 
the words. The court looked at the 
placement of punctuation and deter-
mined that the balancing test was in-
tended to apply to both infamous crimes 
and crimes affecting witness credibil-
ity. Id at 271,619 A.2dat 109. Sec-
ond, the court considered the legislative 
history underlying the adoption of the 
rule to determine the drafters' intent. It 
found that the Standing Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure sought 
to replace the old, dangerously rigid 
rule, by establishing a "broadly-ap-
plied" balancing test to limit the admis-
sibility of all prior convictions. Id 
Next, the court acknowledged the 
differences between the new Maryland 
rule and the federal rule on impeach-
ment by prior conviction. The court 
noted that the federal rule provides for 
automatic admission of crimes of dis-
honesty or falsehood and is, therefore, 
quite inflexible. Id at273,619A.2dat 
110 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2». 
Alternatively, the Maryland rule re-
quires a preliminary balancing test for 
all prior conviction evidence. The court 
concluded that requiring the trial court 
to use the balancing test for both types 
of prior convictions is more consistent 
with the State of Maryland's policy of 
permitting courts to regulate the admis-
sibility of all evidence. Beales, 329 
Md. at 273, 619 A.2d at 110. 
In applying its interpretation of Rule 
1-502 to the facts before it, the court of 
appeals recognized the strong presump-
tion in favor of upholding the trial court's 
decision. Nevertheless, after reviewing 
the record as a whole, the court decided 
that the trial judge had failed to ad-
equately weigh the probative value 
against the risk of unfair prejudice in 
admitting the evidence of Lawrence's 
prior conviction for theft, as required 
by Rule 1-502. Id at 274, 619 A.2d at 
110. The trial judge had demonstrated 
his unawareness of the new rule by 
alluding to the prosecutor's "right" to 
impeach by prior conviction and by 
failing to inquire about the date of the 
theft conviction. Id 
Finally, the court of appeals found 
that thetrialjudge's error was not harm-
less. It held that because of the factual 
nature of the arguments from both par-
ties, thejury's verdict depended prima-
rily on its perception of the witnesses' 
credibility. Id at 275, 619 A.2d at Ill. 
Furthermore, it noted that due to the 
difficulty in determining credibility, 
harmless error analysis would require 
the court to speculate as to what weight 
the jury assigned to Lawrence's testi-
mony. The court, therefore, could not 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
trial judge's error was harm1ess. Ac-
cordingly, it remanded the case to the 
circuit court for a new trial. 
Beales v. State represents the first 
attempt by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland to interpret the new Mary-
land Rule 1-502 governing impeach-
ment of witnesses by prior conviction. 
As interpreted, Rule 1-502 gives the 
trial court considerably broader discre-
tion in ruling on the admission of this 
type of impeachment evidence. Be-
calise the trial judge hears all the testi-
mony and experiences witness demeanor 
first hand, this discretion will probably 
lead to more equitable results. More-
over, although a bright-line rule may 
provide notice as to the admissibility of 
prior convictions for impeachment of 
witnesses, this rule will give opponents 
of the impeachment evidence greater 
capacity to argue against its admissibil-
ity. As a result of this decision, Rule 1-
502 will lead to increasing amounts of 
testimony and greater weight given to 
the testimony of witnesses or parties 
with prior criminal convictions. 
-Kelly A. Casper 
Rosenberg v. Helinski: A WITNESS 
MAY REITERATE THE SUB-
STANCE OF HIS TESTIMONY TO 
JOURNALISTS OUTSIDE A 
COURTROOM, AND HIS RE-
MARKS REMAIN LEGALLY 
PRIVILEGED. 
In Rosenberg v. Helinski, 328 Md. 
664, 616A.2d 866 (1992), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland addressed a case 
of first impression regarding the issue 
of whether remarks made to reporters 
outside a courtroom by a witness are 
privileged. The court held that the 
psychologist's remarks concerning his 
expert testimony at a child abuse hear-
ing, even though defamatory to the 
father's personal reputation, are abso-
lutely privileged, and the psychologist 
is protected from liability. 
The instant case arose out of a di-
vorce hearing before the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore County wherin Mr. 
Helinski requested unsupervised visita-
tion with his two-year old daughter. 
Mrs. Helinski opposed his request; al-
leging that Mr. Helinski had sexually 
abused the child. As evidence of the 
abuse, Mrs. Helinski offered the expert 
testimony of a pediatrician at 
Baltimore's Mercy Hospital, who testi-
fied that the child had a well-healed scar 
which was diagnostic of a sexual abuse 
injury. Holding that there was no con-
nection linking the child's injury to Mr. 
Helinski, the trial court granted the 
divorce, and allowed Mr. Helinski 
unsupervised visitation with his daugh-
ter. 
Despite the court's ruling, Mrs. 
Helinski denied visitation of the child to 
Mr. Helinski, and the couple appeared 
again in a hearing before the Circujt 
Court for Baltimore County. At this 
hearing, Mrs. Helinski offered the testi-
mony of Leon Rosenberg, Ph.D., a child 
psychologist and associate professor of 
medical psychology and pediatrics at 
Johns Hopkins University School of 
Medicine. Dr. Rosenberg'S testimony 
was offered to prove that the abuse had 
occurred, and as a result, Mr. Helinski 
should not have unsupervised visitation 
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